Introduction
There is a multitude of debates, in both theoretical and empirical terms, on how regulation affects risk in the public utility industry. According to Parker (2003) , regulatory risk depends on the different types of regulatory rules and practices applied. Alexander and Irwin (1996) compare the price cap and the rate of return regulation and suggest that the latter implies a lower risk, since it provides a higher guarantee for profit than does the price cap regime. Another source of regulatory risk is the regulatory system "maturity" (Parker, 2003) : the more the regulator knows about a regulated company, the lower the regulatory risk involved. Peltzman (1976) provides one of the most relevant contributions about the relationship between regulation and risk. Based on this theory, known as the Peltzman's hypothesis, the regulators' objective is to maximize political support. Consequently, they buffer extra-cash flows generated by regulated companies between shareholders and customers. As a result, if regulators dampen profits, the company's expected profitability decreases whereas risk increases, and vice versa.
A question of the utmost importance is whether regulatory decisions affect systematic risk. This has important policy implications since systematic risk changes cannot be diversified away and thus regulators should compensate shareholders for bearing such risk (Grout, 1995) .
The purpose of this study is to overcome some literature limitations. First, most of the previous papers analyze the relationship between regulation and systematic risk by taking into account betas as a proxy of the company's systematic risk. Oxera (1996) and Wright et al. (2003) showed that price cap regulation generally increases the betas of regulated firms. Binder and Norton (1999) successfully tested the Peltzman's hypothesis by considering long-term beta estimations, and by partially employing accounting information as explanatory variables. However, based on the CAPM assumptions, there are two different factors determining betas: the company overall risk and the market correlation. Literature lacks formal analyses of how these two variables influence betas. We are presenting a theoretical model to assess the regulatory impact on overall risk and market correlation. In particular, we show that market correlation is a significant proxy of the "pressure" regulators place on companies.
Second, we propose an alternative time-varying approach to analyse the impact of regulation on systematic risk and beta components. Some works address the issue of time-varying betas using the cross-sectional regression analysis approach (see Binder and Norton, 1999) . In particular, they estimate the asset betas of different companies in different periods using traditional methodologies.
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They then regress the estimated betas to a set of explicatory firm-specific variables. However, there are main drawbacks to this methodology: when any problem with heteroskedasticity, dependence or residual non-normality occurs, both the power and significance of the classic regression approach decrease. Other papers use step-dummies Fraser, 2001 and 2002; Robinson and Taylor, 1998) to study regulatory long-term impacts on betas. However, when other beta-modifying events occur in the following step-dummy period, results will be biased. Additionally, there is a greater probability of leaving out significant risk-varying events when companies do not operate exclusively in regulated industries. To address these drawbacks, we employ the classic hypothesistesting approach to study the impact of regulation on beta components.
Our results show that the company's systematic risk varies significantly after regulatory events. In particular, we find negative relationships between abnormal returns and both market correlation and overall risk variations, as predicted by our model. This paper is organized as follows: the second section reports a model for the relationship between company value, betas, overall risk and market correlation; the third section analyses our methodology; the fourth section introduces our sample companies, the regulatory events selected, and the main empirical results of our analysis. The final section concludes by summarizing our main findings.
The Model
Finding a suitable definition of a regulatory event is not a simple task. Most authors (Binder, 1985) define regulatory events as regulation process actions resulting from Authority, Government, and Parliament interventions. In this study we agree with this definition of regulatory event: what really matters is the object of the event, not the body that announces it.
A clear example of a regulatory event is the Authority intervention to set or modify the price-cap parameters such as the initial asset base or the X factor 1 .
When the regulator allows an unexpected increase in the X-factor, and therefore setting a tighter regulation, one would expect to witness negative abnormal returns since due to a significant 1 For an introduction on the price cap methodology and the X factor see Armstrong et al. (1994) and Bishop at al. (1995) . 4 reduction in expected cash flows 2 . Our question is then: do regulatory events affect betas and consequently the cost of capital for regulated industries?
Generally, beta changes are due to overall risk or correlation variations between the company's value and the market index, as showed in the following expression:
β i stands for the company beta, σ i for the company overall risk, ρ i,m for the correlation between the company and the market index, and σ m for the market index return standard deviation 3 . Under the assumption that σ m does not depend on regulatory events 4 , the company's overall risk and its correlation with the market are the only two variables affecting beta.
In the following paragraphs we first analyse how regulatory events affect overall risk σ i . In appendix A we show in particular that, after considering the issues of limited liability, financial distress and bankruptcy costs, the correlation between revenues and overall risk is negative. This important result sounds as common sense but it is only valid after taking into account financial distress and probability of bankruptcy. Indeed, one would expect that if regulation becomes tighter, then the probability of bankruptcy would increase and thus the overall risk would also increase. On the other hand, if regulation becomes softer, then probability of bankruptcy would decrease and consequently the overall risk will decrease too. However, overall risk variations do not always have an impact on betas since the latter only measures systematic risk.
Changes in correlation between the company's share price and the market index account for a good deal of variations in beta. We employ elements of the option theory to try and find a relationship between regulatory events and market correlation. Specifically, the main idea is based on the comparison between two identical monopolistic companies of which only the first is under price regulation.
2 One would think that stricter regulation represents a higher incentive towards efficiency and then it may induce cost reduction in the long-term. However, the incentive effect is mainly induced by the presence of a price cap mechanism. In the context of this paper, a price cap regulation is already in place. Our objective is to analyse the incremental effects of modifying the cap. For these reasons, we assume that the reduction of expected cash flows is the direct consequence of a stricter regulation and vice versa. Our assumption holds for industries with natural monopolistic elements and cannot be generalised to any industry under regulation.
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The company under regulation cannot freely change goods or service prices, whereas the other can change them without constraints. In other words, a significant difference between the two companies, that strongly impacts their relative value, is that the regulator has the option to change product prices of the regulated company, whereas that option is owned by the un-regulated company itself. The assumption is, therefore, that only regulation allows for price changes not controlled by the company, such as those due to changes in input costs.
Analytically, let V r be the value of the regulated company and V the value of the non-regulated company:
V r =V -opt
The term "opt" stands for the regulatory option. The value of this option depends directly on the difference between the expected allowed revenues and costs: the lower this difference, the higher the incentive for the unregulated company to increase prices and, thus, the higher the option value.
An unregulated monopoly will set price so that marginal costs equal marginal revenues whereas regulators will set prices to a lower level, theoretically equal to marginal costs subjected to the constraint to recover at least average costs. In the latter case, the difference between revenues and costs is lower and then the option value is higher.
Another way to reinterpret this option is to consider it as an indicator of the "competitive pressure"
under which a company operates. Whereas in competitive environments it is the market that directly imposes that pressure on companies, in regulated industries the regulator itself manages the pressure.
The tighter the regulation, the lower the value of the regulated company and the higher the option value.
As seen above, the option value under market conditions is higher than under monopolistic conditions, since the difference between revenues and costs is generally lower in the former case.
Then, the option value for regulated companies would be in between the two extreme cases described above.
It is important to observe that the regulator itself (not the regulated company) owns the option described above: the higher the option, the lower the value of the regulated company.
The option value can be interpreted as an indicator of the "distance" from unregulated monopoly conditions. It depends on the strength of regulation: the softer the regulation, the lower the option value. This model explains why the correlation between the market and the regulated company will 6 increase when regulation becomes tighter, and vice versa. Figure 4 The discounted cash flow model (DCF) may present our model findings in a different way. With DCF, we may write company value V i as follows:
Where R j and C j stand for the company's expected revenues and costs respectively; r i is the company cost of capital employed to discount expected cash flows, and j is the time variable. In our model the cost of capital r i depends on overall risk σ i and market correlation ρ i,m .
When regulation becomes softer (stricter) there are two different implications on V i variables: 1) Revenue R j increases (decreases) (Cash flow implication);
2) Beta determinants, σ i and ρ i,m , decrease (increase) (Risk implication).
Clearly, in the case of regulatory events, both the above consequences increase (decrease) company value V i , while yielding positive (negative) abnormal returns.
Here is a summary of the model's implications. For regulatory events, if regulation becomes tighter, abnormal returns will be negative, whereas correlation and overall risk will increase. Vice versa, if regulation becomes softer, abnormal return will be positive, whereas correlation and overall risk will decrease. These implications confirm the Peltzman's suggestions that there is a positive correlation between abnormal returns and beta variations. Furthermore, our work has theoretically explained how regulatory events affect the two beta components: overall risk and market correlation. However, the model considers the impact of price-cap changes and cannot explain the analyze the methodology and the sample companies used to test the above model.
The Methodology
Our empirical analysis is composed of two parts. First, we apply the event analysis approach in order to determine the impact of regulatory events on abnormal returns and beta variations, overall risk and market correlation, and whether that impact is statistically significant.
The methodological approach of event analysis using market stock prices is the most widespread to measure the effects of regulation (Binder, 1985 and 1998; Antoniou and Pescetto, 1997) . The main problem with the event analysis approach consists in identifying the event timing. Boardman et al. (1997) use an information diffusion model to estimate the impact of regulatory events. Warner (1980 and were the first to argue that event period uncertainty decreases the power of empirical tests. We may assume that in stock price regulatory event analyses, we can measure the unexpected components of the announcements (Binder, 1985; Schumann, 1988) .
The abnormal return benchmark model (Binder, 1998) considered in this study is the CAPM of Lintner (1965) and Sharpe (1964) . Regulators and academics widely apply this model when addressing risk and return behavior in most network utilities. The return generating process of the CAPM, assuming a fixed risk-return relationship, presents the following expression:
Where R it stands for the continuously compounded return from a risky asset (i), R ft for the continuously compounded return from a risk-free asset, β it for the systematic risk measure of asset i.
According to this model, the random error term is e it .
The main difference when compared to the classic event analysis methodology (Fama et al., 1969) is that here betas are not constant over time. Several works (Antoniou and Pescetto, 1997; Buckland and Fraser, 2001; Cooper and Currie, 1999; Groenewold and Fraser, 1999; Morana and Sawkins, 2000; Robinson and Taylor, 1998) support the time-varying beta hypothesis.
In particular Antoniou and Pescetto (1997) and Fraser (2001 and 2002) use that methodology to estimate the regulatory impact on both abnormal returns and betas. They show that well-defined regulatory events have a strong impact on betas.
We take into consideration a time varying 'state-space' model that employs the Kalman Filter procedure for beta estimation (Buckland and Fraser, 2002; Fisher and Kamin, 1985) . For technical details see Appendix D.
In our model, abnormal returns AR it are determined by the difference between the actual returns and the CAPM expected returns:
This approach is significantly different from Buckland and Fraser's, since we only need to estimate the CAPM beta coefficients and not the alphas because, anyway, the CAPM alpha coefficient is the risk-free-investment return R ft .
By using the Kalman filter, we can not only estimate betas but also the overall risk and market correlation. Therefore, through a hypothesis-testing event analysis, we can also test whether regulatory events significantly impact abnormal returns, betas and their components.
In particular, event analysis testing normally applies to abnormal returns, since they are average stochastic variables with average expectation equal to zero. Then we turn betas, overall risk and market correlation into variables that have average expectation equal to zero by considering their percentage variations period-by-period. For example, beta varies as follows 5 :
Analogously, we can obtain overall risk and market correlation variations, ∆σ it and ∆ρ it respectively.
In testing the zero-average null hypothesis, we consider both a one-day and a three-day event period, 6 and a 300-day estimation period. For a multi-day event period, we test cumulated abnormal returns (CAR), and cumulated beta, overall risk and market correlation variations.
There are a few problems we would like to address, such as the residual lack of normality, heteroskedasticity, and cross-sectional dependence. Therefore, we consider five different statistic tests jointly. In particular, we take into account the classic event analysis test (Fama et al., 1969) , the dependence-adjusted test Warner, 1980 and , and the heteroskedasticityadjusted standardized test (Patell, 1976) . For what concerns residual non-normality, we apply two non-parametric tests: the sign test (Cowan, 1992) and the rank test (Corrado, 1989) . 5 In the empirical analysis we consider the regulatory effects on equity betas even if the theoretical discussion reported above refers to the overall beta of the company, which also depends on debt betas and gearing (Oxera, 1996) . However, since no variation in gearing happened during the analysed events, considering only equity beta changes does not undermine the results on our analysis. 6 From the day before to the day after the official event date. We also consider company-specific variables: D i stands for the impulse-dummy company-specific variable.
We decide to use the linear form since equations 2, for small changes, seems to indicate a linear relationship between beta, overall risk and market correlation variations. However, we successfully tested this model against non-linear functional forms using the reset test (Thomas, 1985, pp. 140-157) .
We expect the regression coefficients related to market correlation variations and overall risk variations, γ and δ respectively, to be negative. Following section 2, company-favoring regulatory events induce positive abnormal returns and negative overall risk and market correlation variations (vice versa also applies).
The Empirical Analysis
We consider the company sample consisting of the 12 Regional Electricity Companies (RECs) operating in the UK electricity distribution field (see Appendix C for the company list). The source of the twelve RECs' stock price data is Datastream. In particular, we examine the period from December 10 th , 1990, their first listing day, to October 2 nd , 1995, Southwestern Electricity's last listing day, before being acquired by Southern Electric, a US public utility company. Different studies Fraser, 2001 and 2002; Dnes et al., 1998; Robinson and Taylor, 1998) analyze this period, since it offers a unique opportunity for comparing stock price behaviors of 11 several price-cap regulated firms. By the end of 1998, other public utility companies, mainly from the USA, had acquired and thus de-listed all the RECs.
Please find a regulatory event list in Appendix B. We selected 22 regulatory events by using the following information sources: Financial Times articles, Authority and Government official statements, and other papers (Buckland and Fraser, 2002; Dnes et al., 1998) . In Appendix B, for each event, we also formulate our hypotheses in terms of abnormal returns, beta variations, overall risk variations and market correlation variations according to our theoretical implications of section 2. We considered the FTSE All Share as a market index 9 . As explained below, the main problem with empirical analysis is that it is not always clear whether an event is regulatory or political.
Since another recurrent problem in event analysis is to correctly identify when new information is released to the market, we propose a technique to test the robustness of our event dates. For each event we construct an index in the following way:
AR i represents the abnormal return during the event date i. P represents the days of the testing period which is defined as a set of days close to the event day. If the index is higher than 1, it means that the event day itself is more significant than the days of the testing period. For our analysis we consider 2 days before the event date and 2 days after the event date as testing period. Taking longer testing periods could result in mixing the effects of other events, not necessarily due to regulation. Since we analyse regulation effects not just on abnormal returns but also on systematic risk, we also calculate an analogue index with reference to beta variations. The two indexes are shown in table 1.
When the two indexes are both lower than 1, it means that the event day has a lower impact than its testing period days on both abnormal returns and beta variations. In this case the event may be incorrectly identified, as shown in the last column of table 1. We selected 8 events as potentially incorrectly identified. However, the condition of both indexes being lesser than one is just a necessary but not sufficient condition for incorrect identification. In other words, the two indexes may be lower than 1 just because the event has no significant impact and not because it is incorrectly identified. In particular, events number 4, 5, 8, 13 and 16 are not significant, as shown in table 2, nor are significant other days of their testing periods. The remaining three events possibly 12 incorrectly identified are the number 10, 15 and 18. Even if they are statistically significant, a further analysis shows that the most significant day in these three cases is the day after the event.
That does not mean the three events are not correctly identified but only that the market reaction is not instantaneous but lasts more days. Our analysis shows evidence that the event days selected for our analysis are not incorrectly identified. 
No

Overall Risk Variation
Market
Correlation
Variation 1-Apr-92 -4,78%*** 23,86%*** 29,16%*** 4,04%** -5,12%*** 23,63%*** 27,62%*** 2,41%
7-Jul-92 1,71%*** 3,07% 4,13%* 2,90% 3,45%*** 1,08% 1,82% 5,46%
2-Sept-92 -3,15%*** -3,29% 2,70% -6,07% -6,28%*** -6,22% 2,08% -6,10% 29-Jan-93 -2,09%*** 28,43%*** 6,70% 27,45%*** -3,37%*** 31,16%** 5,81% 28,91%*** 9-Jul.-93 2,04%*** -9,42%*** 3,04%*** -11,33%*** 2,07%*** -9,76%*** 0,39% -11,09%*** 4-Aug-93 -0,73% 0,96% -0,64% 0,18% -0,72% -1,45% -3,36%* 1,53%
26-Oct-93 0,95%*** -7,34%*** -0,18% -6,72%** 1,59%*** -6,85% -2,09% -6,39%
14-Feb.94 -2,21%*** 1,35%** 2,20%*** -2,22% -2,09%*** 6,61%*** 2,86%*** 3,15%
22-June-94 -1,99%*** -1,71%*** 1,55%** -4,24%*** -0,79% -4,30%*** -0,61% -3,98%** 28-June-94 3,11%*** -1,18%** 5,14%*** -7,32%*** 5,13%*** 4,26%*** 8,02%*** 0,04%
11-Aug-94 6,13%*** -17,30%*** 17,43%** -27,01%*** 7,12%*** -9,01%*** 20,54%*** -21,89%*** 29-Sept-94 -0,44% 1,34%* -0,90% 5,51%*** -1,39%* 0,01% -2,89% 7,03%*** 28-Oct-94 0,63% 0,89% -0,73% 1,04% 3,21% 6,51% 2,12% 7,34%
15-Nov-94 -0,55% -1,22% -1,53% 2,04% 0,23% -1,87% -4,24% 2,14%
22-Feb-95 -2,15%*** -1,32% 1,26% -3,78% -5,31%*** -10,80%*** 2,39%* -11,74%*** 23-Feb-95 -3,11%*** -9,49%*** 2,52%*** -7,85%*** -4,15%** -14,17%*** 2,58%* -11,20%*** 7-Mar-95 -15,40%*** 113,36%*** 112,84%*** 17,67%*** -22,25%***110,93%*** 115,30%*** 11,00%
24-Mar-95 -1,87%*** -1,45% -1,10% -1,32% -2,58%*** -1,62% -3,99% -1,36%
6-June-95 2,01%*** -1,30% 0,69% -3,21%*** 4,36%*** -2,05% 2,63% -5,19%*** (Patell, 1976 ).
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The relationship between abnormal returns and beta variations generally follows the model described above: the higher the abnormal returns, the less the beta variations. Furthermore, betas change significantly in seven events over twenty-two, thus confirming the time-varying hypothesis.
The Northern Ireland Electricity vesting day event, on 1 st April 1992, indirectly increased competitive pressure on RECs. The REC average abnormal return was 4,78%, whereas betas increased by 23,86% on average.
On 29 th January 1993, a Trade and Industry Committee report called for a reduction on the RECs' return on capital. Average abnormal returns were equal to -2,09%, and betas increased by 28,43%.
On 9 th July 1993, the Authority established the new supply business X factor, and it was less than expected. Consequently, abnormal returns were positive and risk decreased. On 26 th October 1993, a favorable consultation paper on the RECs' assets cost of capital and operating cost was released.
Consequently company value increased (+0,95%), and betas decreased considerably (-7,34%). On 11 th August 1994 the Authority's new distribution price proposal, strongly favourable to RECs, had a considerable impact. Average abnormal returns were +6,13%, and betas went down by 17,30% on average. On 7 th March 1995, the electricity director announced his intention of anticipating the new price revision. This event had the strongest impact on abnormal returns and betas: average abnormal returns were -15,40%, and betas more than doubled (+113,36%).
The only significant regulatory event that apparently did not follow the theoretical relationship described above occurred on 23 rd February 1995. Indiscretions made known in advance the price revision event, which eventually happened on 7 th March 1995. In this case, average abnormal returns were negative (-3,11%), and betas decreased (-9,49%). This can be explained by observing that before this event there had been public debates about the possibility of limiting the RECs' huge profits due to weak regulatory pressure. Even though RECs expected a regulatory intervention, none knew exactly the extent. When the market eventually learned about the regulatory intervention type, risk decreased.
The above counter-example raises the analysis' main shortcoming: it is generally difficult to classify an event as regulatory. As seen above, a regulatory event concerns only the regulation process. Although the underlying general idea is straightforward, events may have not only regulation but also policy implications. Clearly the decision to anticipate the regulatory revision has several possible policy implications. For examples, it could prelude to radical regulatory shifts towards other stricter methodologies, regulation governance systems or, at the extreme point, some forms of re-nationalization. Alternatively, it could anticipate unforeseeable profit-cutting interventions, such as Tony Blair's wind-fall tax.
Thus, the negative relationship between betas and abnormal returns applies to almost any regulatory event, as predicted by the above model.
One would ask whether the regulatory effect on betas is only transitory or has a long-term effect on the cost of capital. The event study methodology cannot be extended to long periods since there is a high probability to mix the effects of events of different nature. Figure 6 shows the time-varying beta estimation for the equal-weighted portfolio of RECs in the period between 1991 and 1995. 
Figure 6. Time-varying Beta Of the RECs Equal-Weighted Portfolio In the 1991-1995 Period.
The first date marked in the figure is related to the 1 st April 1992 event in which a strong increase in betas is observed. It is not simple to isolate the effect of this event since after 9 days a general election took place, in which the Conservative party unexpectedly won, causing a further increase in betas. Such event is not specifically considered in our analysis since it is does not regard price-cap regulation. However, in September 1992 the beta returned below the initial level.
The second and the third date marked in the figure are related to other two very significant events in which betas changed, 29 th January 1993 and 11 th August 1994 respectively. Also in these cases, the beta returned, at the previous level in a few weeks, at least in qualitative terms.
The last mark in figure 6 is related to the strongest event considered in our analysis, 7 th March 1995, in which the Director of Electricity broke the price-cap contract before expiration causing a sharp increase in betas. In this case, at the end of 1995, betas did not move substantially from the postevent level.
In the period 1991-1995, the beta of the equal-weighted portfolio of RECs increased from a 0,5 level to a 0,8 level. It is not possible to say that this change is due to the sole regulatory action. The equity beta may be influenced by other factors, respect to which regulatory action is not influent;
for example the level of debt can be considered constant only in the short term and geographical and industry diversification strategies can alter the systematic risk of equity in absence of regulatory interventions. In this case we cannot affirm beforehand that the effect of regulatory actions -that according to the empirical analysis of the paper do indeed exist -are transitory, mainly for the very reason that regulatory events are not the sole cause of variations in equity beta.
Thus, a priori, the regulator cannot know if its intervention is temporary or not, and thus it cannot ignore the results.
Table 2 also shows the regulatory event impact on market correlation and overall risk. It appears that market correlation variations generally follow beta variations. When regulation becomes softer, abnormal returns will be positive, betas will decrease, and market correlation will be expected to decrease too. For example, on 11 th August 1994, betas and market returns significantly decreased, and abnormal returns were positive. One the other hand, overall risk changes do not seem to follow the above-mentioned relationship.
Furthermore, the impact of events on overall risk does not seem to yield the expected results. For example, on 11 th August 1994, overall risk increased significantly, whereas beta and market correlation variations were negative. This seems to contradict theoretic expectations: based on the above model, we expect to find a positive relationship between beta and overall risk variations. To explain this anomaly, we have to consider, as several authors have pointed out (Boehmer at al., 1991; Patell, 1976) , that the event itself may increase price volatility. Following the event-induced variance hypothesis, one would expect that overall risk (measured as the return standard deviation)
would increase, whenever a regulatory event occurs, and not only when regulation becomes stricter.
Nevertheless, according to the above model, one would expect that if regulation becomes stricter, overall risk will increase more than in the company-favorable regulatory event case. It is clear that event analysis is useless to test this correlation. In the second phase of empirical analysis we try to employ a regression analysis to examine whether company-favorable events yield higher overall risk than company-unfavorable events.
So far, market correlation seems to be the most beta-affecting component: we can interpret it as the competitive pressure the regulator puts on regulated companies as seen above. Figure 7 shows the market correlation of the RECs equal-weighted portfolio. It ranged between 50%, in the middle of 1992, and 10%, at the end of 1993. The latter minimum market correlation date stands as a turning point in regulatory policy: after that, regulation became gradually stricter. First, the regulator reviewed distribution prices cutting them by 10-15%, even though regulated companies expected a stronger reduction. Second, just after one year of the new regulatory period, the regulator changed distribution prices again by increasing the X factors from 2% to 3%. The extent to which the regulator tried to increase pressure on companies is well documented in figure 6 : up to the end of 1995, market correlation increased from 10% to 30%.
In this sense, regulator behaviour is not atypical. Following Baldwin and Cave (1996) when utilities are privatised, the price caps to which they are subjected are usually set too high. They find the main reason in the information asymmetry between regulators and regulated firms. The management of a regulated firm is better versed in matters concerning it than the regulator, and can use this advantage in order to procure a lax cap. This asymmetry will diminish over time as the regulator gathers experience. The second phase of our empirical analysis tests the model introduced above. In particular, for each REC and for each event, we consider the relationship between abnormal returns, market correlation and overall risk variations, as reported in equation [7] and considering a one-day event period.
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The first part of table 3 shows the regression results: the coefficients of the overall risk variation and the market correlation variation, γ and δ respectively, are negative and statistically significant.
12
The higher the abnormal returns, the lower the market correlation and overall risk variations, and vice versa. Interestingly, dummy coefficients α i are not significant for any company. Empirical findings confirm our model. In order to test the robustness of the results related to the choice of the event period, we also repeated the analysis considering variables from a three-day event period and from a five-day event period. The results are also shown in table 3 and are coherent with those obtained from a one-day event period. The only difference is that the statistical significance of the t-tests, the F-test and the corrected R 2 decreases with the length of the event period, as expected. The results confirm the correct identification of the event dates in which new regulatory information is released to the market.
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We repeated this analysis considering only the events that are found to be statistical different from zero at 90% in the first phase (Table 2) in at least one variable among abnormal returns, beta variation, overall risk variation and market correlation variation 13 . The results strictly confirm those of table 3, with a slightly higher significance level of the T-tests for the market correlation variation, δ.
We further examine company specific characteristics testing a simplified version of equation [7] for individual companies, for an equally weighted portfolio and for a value weighted portfolio. In particular, the model to be tested is:
AR j = α + γ∆σ j + δ∆ρ j + e j j=1, …., 22 observations Table 4 reports the company specific results. Also at the company level we find a strong negative correlation between abnormal returns, overall risk and market correlation variations. The only coefficient different from our prediction is the market correlation variation ∆ρ j of Northern Electricity, NTE, which is positive but without statistical significance. The likeness of the model 13 The six events eliminated are the number 4,5,8,13,16 and 17. 20 outcomes for each REC and their portfolios is not surprising since these companies are very similar for dimension and business activity. In fact, they all operate in the sector of electricity distribution in different areas of UK.
Concluding remarks
Following the developments of regulation, an interesting debate has emerged about the regulatory impact on company value and risk. Even though different works have found a negative relationship between abnormal returns and CAPM beta variations, no study has analyzed whether systematic risk variations are due to overall risk variations or to market correlation variations.
This paper aims at overcoming the lack of literature on this issue by considering an analytical model. This model leads to the following results: i) there is a negative relationship between abnormal returns and overall risk variations and ii) there is a negative relationship between abnormal returns and market correlation variations. In other words, regulatory events affect both overall risk and market correlation in the same direction. In particular, we can obtain the latter theoretical result by considering the option on regulated company price changes owned by the regulator. We believe that market correlation represents a proxy of that option and, therefore, one could use it to measure the "competitive pressure" regulators apply to the above regulated companies.
To test this theoretical model, we use a methodology where CAPM betas are allowed to vary over time. Through this method we can estimate the impact of regulatory events on the company's abnormal returns, beta, overall risk and market correlation variations. Our company sample consisted in the twelve Regional Electricity Companies (RECs) operating in the English electricity distribution industry. First of all, we use the event study hypothesis testing approach to find the regulatory impact of the selected 22 regulatory events. In order to strengthen our empirical findings, we use the regression approach to analyze the relationships between abnormal returns, overall risk and market correlation variations. We successfully tested our model in the RECs industry and also at the company level, obtaining very significant negative relationships between abnormal returns, and both overall risk and market correlation variations. When regulation becomes stricter, abnormal returns are negative, and betas increase due to both overall risk and market correlation increases, and vice versa.
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The results of our event analysis carry important policy implications. The effect of a regulatory event can be properly identified only in the related event window. In this context, we find that it significantly affects systematic risk. However, if we consider longer periods, events of different nature, respect to which the regulatory action is not influent, may occur. For this reason, the regulator should not ignore beforehand our empirical and theoretical findings, even in a long-term perspective.
Future developments of this work could test our model on different data sets. For example, one possible study is whether the relationships verified in the English electricity distribution also hold in other regulated industries, such as telecommunications, gas and water supply. Even though we developed this model by considering a price cap regulation scenario, one could also generalize it by analyzing the case of rate of return regulation. Furthermore, this study points out a useful tool to test the regulator's strength: the correlation between the regulated company and the market could help measure regulatory effectiveness, and could consequently be employed to test the capture hypothesis.
Appendix A
The expected returns µ in a certain period can be defined as follows:
Where c is the company total cost, p(c) is the cost distribution probability, R is the revenue allowed by the price cap system, and V 0 is the initial capital invested by shareholders in the company. It corresponds to the initial market value of the company before any revenue changes. R-c represents the company's profit.
Expected returns variance σ 2 represents a shareholder's overall risk proxy:
We are going to differentiate the two latter expressions with respect to R in order to see how regulation affects expected returns and variance:
[10]
The initial capital employed V 0 is not affected by changes in revenues. The meaning of derivative
[10] is straightforward: the higher the revenues, the higher the expected returns. From the second derivative we understand that revenue variations do not change volatility and risk. It is important to note that this model does not consider either limited liability or any possible bankruptcies. Thus, increases in the allowed revenue R have an impact only on expected profits but not on risk.
When taking limited liability into consideration, the expected returns and variance expressions become: By calculating the new expected returns and variance differentials with respect to R, it is possible to obtain the following expressions:
Then we introduce probability of default p f , defined as the probability that the company will lose its entire initial capital V 0 :
[16] Since p f is non-negative by definition, the variance derivative with respect to revenues R is nonnegative as well. This result is counterintuitive since one would expect that if revenues increase then not only will the probability of default go down, but firm risk will decrease, too. However, this analysis considers neither financial distress nor bankruptcy costs. Under these assumptions, the default scenario decreases the variance of expected returns. Consequently, the lower the probability of default, the higher the expected returns variance. The extreme scenario would occur when probability of default is equal to one: this is a "free-risk" scenario, since the expected returns are certainly equal to -100%.
By considering financial distress and bankruptcy costs, then the shareholder's expected returns are: Under these realistic assumptions the derivates are complicated functions. However, a positive correlation between expected returns and revenues is likely to occur. In this case, research would consider a simulation to study the revenues-variance relationship.
Here is an example: the company cost function is normally distributed with average 5,000 and variance 2,000. The company initial activity value is 5,000 (V 0 ), the financial distress loss limit, written as a percentage of company activity value, is 15% (i=15%). Both the financial distress and bankruptcy costs are 15% of the company initial activity value (C f =C b =15%V 0 ). Figure 3 portraits the results of our simulation. It is interesting to note that increases in revenues induce decreases in variance. The same figure shows also the bankruptcy probability: when it tends to zero, returns variance is at a level around 15,3%. The latter result is not surprising since this scenario is equivalent to that considering neither limited liability nor bankruptcy probability. 
